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030304

16805 U.S. PTO

PTO/SB/16 (01-04)

Approved for use through 07/31/2006. OMB 0651-0032

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PROVISIONAL APPLICATION FOR PATENT COVER SHEET

This is a request for filing a PROVISIONAL APPLICATION FOR PATENT under 37 CFR 1.53(c).

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19587 U.S. PTO
60/550069

INVENTOR(S)					
Given Name (first and middle (if any))		Family Name or Surname		Residence (City and either State or Foreign Country)	
THOMAS		ZENG		SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA	
Additional inventors are being named on the _____ separately numbered sheets attached hereto					
TITLE OF THE INVENTION (500 characters max)					
A playlist play method and Protocol to enable traverse Network Address Translators (NAT) and interact with Firewalls, authenticate firewall transversal protocols, map interactive connectivity establishments and announce signal end of stream.					
Direct all correspondence to: CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESS					
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Customer Number: 35114					
OR					
<input type="checkbox"/> Firm or Individual Name		ALCATEL USA			
Address					
Address					
City		State		Zip	
Country		Telephone		Fax	
ENCLOSED APPLICATION PARTS (check all that apply)					
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Specification Number of Pages 59		<input type="checkbox"/> CD(s), Number _____			
<input type="checkbox"/> Drawing(s) Number of Sheets _____		<input type="checkbox"/> Other (specify) _____			
<input type="checkbox"/> Application Data Sheet. See 37 CFR 1.76					
METHOD OF PAYMENT OF FILING FEES FOR THIS PROVISIONAL APPLICATION FOR PATENT					
<input type="checkbox"/> Applicant claims small entity status. See 37 CFR 1.27.		FILING FEE Amount (\$)			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> A check or money order is enclosed to cover the filing fees.		160.00			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> The Director is hereby authorized to charge filing fees or credit any overpayment to Deposit Account Number: 02-3979					
<input type="checkbox"/> Payment by credit card. Form PTO-2038 is attached.					
The invention was made by an agency of the United States Government or under a contract with an agency of the United States Government.					
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No.					
<input type="checkbox"/> Yes, the name of the U.S. Government agency and the Government contract number are: _____					

[Page 1 of 2]

Respectfully submitted

SIGNATURE

TYPED or PRINTED NAME DAVID A. CORDEIRO

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Date MARCH 3, 2004

REGISTRATION NO. 48,134

(if appropriate)

Docket Number: 134188 P

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**FEE TRANSMITTAL
for FY 2004**

Effective 10/01/2003. Patent fees are subject to annual revision.

☐ Applicant claims small entity status. See 37 CFR 1.27**TOTAL AMOUNT OF PAYMENT** (\$) 160**Complete if Known**

Application Number	
Filing Date	MARCH 3, 2004
First Named Inventor	THOMAS ZENG
Examiner Name	
Art Unit	
Attorney Docket No.	134188 P

METHOD OF PAYMENT (check all that apply)☒ Check ☐ Credit card ☐ Money Order ☐ Other ☐ None☒ Deposit Account:Deposit Account Number
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Michael B. Brooks

The Director is authorized to: (check all that apply)

☐ Charge fee(s) indicated below ☒ Credit any overpayments☒ Charge any additional fee(s) or any underpayment of fee(s)☐ Charge fee(s) indicated below, except for the filing fee to the above-identified deposit account.**FEE CALCULATION****1. BASIC FILING FEE**

Large Entity		Small Entity		Fee Description	Fee Paid
Fee Code	Fee (\$)	Fee Code	Fee (\$)		
1001	770	2001	385	Utility filing fee	
1002	340	2002	170	Design filing fee	
1003	530	2003	265	Plant filing fee	
1004	770	2004	385	Reissue filing fee	
1005	160	2005	80	Provisional filing fee	160
SUBTOTAL (1)					(\$) 160

2. EXTRA CLAIM FEES FOR UTILITY AND REISSUE

		Extra Claims		Fee from below		Fee Paid	
Total Claims	<input type="text"/>	-20** =	<input type="text"/>	X	<input type="text"/>	=	<input type="text"/>
Independent Claims	<input type="text"/>	-3** =	<input type="text"/>	X	<input type="text"/>	=	<input type="text"/>
Multiple Dependent	<input type="text"/>				<input type="text"/>	=	<input type="text"/>

Large Entity		Small Entity		Fee Description	Fee Paid
Fee Code	Fee (\$)	Fee Code	Fee (\$)		
1202	18	2202	9	Claims in excess of 20	
1201	86	2201	43	Independent claims in excess of 3	
1203	290	2203	145	Multiple dependent claim, if not paid	
1204	86	2204	43	** Reissue independent claims over original patent	
1205	18	2205	9	** Reissue claims in excess of 20 and over original patent	
SUBTOTAL (2)					(\$)

**or number previously paid, if greater; For Reissues, see above

FEE CALCULATION (continued)**3. ADDITIONAL FEES**


Large Entity		Small Entity		Fee Description	Fee Paid
Fee Code	Fee (\$)	Fee Code	Fee (\$)		
1051	130	2051	65	Surcharge - late filing fee or oath	
1052	50	2052	25	Surcharge - late provisional filing fee or cover sheet	
1053	130	1053	130	Non-English specification	
1812	2,520	1812	2,520	For filing a request for <i>ex parte</i> reexamination	
1804	920*	1804	920*	Requesting publication of SIR prior to Examiner action	
1805	1,840*	1805	1,840*	Requesting publication of SIR after Examiner action	
1251	110	2251	55	Extension for reply within first month	
1252	420	2252	210	Extension for reply within second month	
1253	950	2253	475	Extension for reply within third month	
1254	1,480	2254	740	Extension for reply within fourth month	
1255	2,010	2255	1,005	Extension for reply within fifth month	
1401	330	2401	165	Notice of Appeal	
1402	330	2402	165	Filing a brief in support of an appeal	
1403	290	2403	145	Request for oral hearing	
1451	1,510	1451	1,510	Petition to institute a public use proceeding	
1452	110	2452	55	Petition to revive - unavoidable	
1453	1,330	2453	665	Petition to revive - unintentional	
1501	1,330	2501	665	Utility issue fee (or reissue)	
1502	480	2502	240	Design issue fee	
1503	640	2503	320	Plant issue fee	
1460	130	1460	130	Petitions to the Commissioner	
1807	50	1807	50	Processing fee under 37 CFR 1.17(q)	
1806	180	1806	180	Submission of Information Disclosure Stmt	
8021	40	8021	40	Recording each patent assignment per property (times number of properties)	
1809	770	2809	385	Filing a submission after final rejection (37 CFR 1.129(a))	
1810	770	2810	385	For each additional invention to be examined (37 CFR 1.129(b))	
1801	770	2801	385	Request for Continued Examination (RCE)	
1802	900	1802	900	Request for expedited examination of a design application	

Other fee (specify)

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SUBTOTAL (3) (\$)**SUBMITTED BY**

(Complete if applicable)

Name (Print/Type)	MICHAEL B. BROOKS	Registration No. (Attorney/Agent)	39,921	Telephone	818-225-2920
Signature		Date	MARCH 3, 2004		

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How to Enable Real-Time Streaming Protocol (RTSP) traverse Network
Address Translators (NAT) and interact with Firewalls.
<draft-ietf-mmusic-rtsp-nat-02.txt>

Status of this memo

This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.

Abstract

This document describes six different types of NAT traversal
techniques that can be used by RTSP. For each technique a
description on how it shall be used, what security implications it
has and other deployment considerations are given. Further a
description on how RTSP relates to firewalls is given.

1. Definitions

1.1. Glossary

ALG - Application Level Gateway, an entity that can be embedded
in a NAT to perform the application layer functions
required for a particular protocol to traverse the NAT
[6]
ICE - Interactive Connectivity Establishment, see [9].
DNS - Domain Name Service
MID - Media Identifier from Grouping of media lines in SDP, see
[10].
NAT - Network Address Translator, see [12].
NAT-PT - Network Address Translator Protocol Translator, see [13]
RTP - Real-time Transport Protocol, see [5].
RTSP - Real-Time Streaming Protocol, see [1] and [7].
SDP - Session Description Protocol, see [2].
SSRC - Synchronization source in RTP, see [5].
TBD - To Be Decided

1.2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL
NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL"

in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [4].

2. Introduction

Today there is a proliferative deployment of different flavors of Network Address Translator (NAT) boxes that in practice follow no open standards [12][18]. NATs cause discontinuity in address realms [18], therefore a protocol, such as RTSP, needs to try to make sure that it can deal with such discontinuities caused by NATs. The problem with RTSP is that, being a media control protocol that manages one or more media streams, it carries information about network addresses and ports inside itself. Because of this, even if RTSP itself, when carried over TCP for example, is not blocked by NATs, its media streams are often blocked by NATs when RTSP based streaming servers are deployed as is and without special provisions to support NAT traversal.

Like NATs, firewalls (FWs) are also middle boxes that need to be considered. They are deployed to prevent non-desired traffic/protocols to be able to get in or out of the protected network. RTSP is designed such that a firewall can be configured to let RTSP controlled media streams to go through with minimal implementation problems. However there is a need for more detailed information on how FWs should be configured to work with RTSP.

This document describes the usage of known NAT traversal mechanisms that can be used with RTSP. Following the guidelines spelled out in [18], we describe the required RTSP protocol extensions for each method, transition strategies, and we also discuss each method's security concerns.

This document is not based on RFC 2326 [1]. It is instead based and dependent on the updated RTSP specification [7], which is under development in IETF MMUSIC WG. The updated specification is a much-needed attempt to correct a number of shortcomings of RFC 2326. One important change is that the specification is split into several parts. So far only the updated core specification of RTSP is available in [7]. This document is one extension document to this core spec to document a special functionality that extends the RTSP protocol. This document is intended to be updated to stay consistent with the core protocol.

2.1. NATs

Today there exist a number of different NAT types and usage areas. The different NAT types are cited here from STUN [6]:

Full Cone: A full cone NAT is one where all requests from the same internal IP address and port are mapped to the same external IP address and port. Furthermore, any external host can send a packet to the internal host, by sending a packet to the mapped external address.

Restricted Cone: A restricted cone NAT is one where all requests from the same internal IP address and port are mapped to the same external IP address and port. Unlike a full cone NAT, an external host (with IP address X) can send a packet to the internal host only if the internal host had previously sent a packet to IP address X.

Port Restricted Cone: A port restricted cone NAT is like a restricted cone NAT, but the restriction includes port numbers. Specifically, an external host can send a packet, with source IP address X and source port P, to the internal host only if the internal host had previously sent a packet to IP address X and port P.

Symmetric: A symmetric NAT is one where all requests from the same internal IP address and port, to a specific destination IP address and port, are mapped to the same external IP address and port. If the same host sends a packet with the same source address and port, but to a different destination, a different mapping is used. Furthermore, only the external host that receives a packet can send a UDP packet back to the internal host.

NATs are used on both small and large scale. The normal small-scale user is home user that has a NAT to allow multiple computers share the single IP address given by their Internet Service Provider (ISP). The large scale users are the ISP's themselves that give there users private addresses. This is done both for control and for lack of IP addresses.

Native Address Translation and Protocol Translation (NAT-PT) [13] is a mechanism used for IPv4 to IPv6 transition. This device is used to allow devices only having connectivity using one of the IP versions to communicate with the other address domain. If the other address domain is addressable through the use of domain names, then a DNS ALG assigns temporary IP addresses in the requestor's domain. The NAT-PT device translates this temporary address to the receivers true IP address and at the same time modify all necessary fields to be correct in the receiver's address domain.

2.2. Firewalls

A firewall (FW) is a security gateway that enforces certain access control policies between two network administrative domains: a private domain (intranet) and a public domain (public internet). Many organizations use firewalls to prevent privacy intrusions and malicious attacks to corporate computing resources in the private intranet [19].

A comparison between NAT and FW are given below:

1. FW must be a gateway between two network administrative domains, while NAT does not have to sit between two domains. In fact, in many corporations there are many NAT boxes within the intranet, in which case the NAT boxes sit between subnets.
2. NAT does not in itself provide security, although some access control policies can be implemented using address translation schemes.
3. NAT and FWs are similar in that they can both be configured to allow multiple network hosts to share a single public IP address. In other words, a host behind a NAT or FW can have a private IP address and a public one, so for NAT and FW there is the issue of address mapping which is important in order for RTSP protocol to work properly when there are NATs and FWs between the RTSP server and its clients.

In the rest of this memo we use the phrase "NAT traversal" interchangeably with "NAT/FW traversal" and "NAT/Firewall traversal".

3. Requirements

This section considers the set of requirements when designing or evaluating RTSP NAT solutions.

RTSP is a client/server protocol, and as such the targeted applications in general deploy RTSP servers in the public address realm. However, there are use cases where the reverse is true: RTSP clients are connecting from public address realm to RTSP servers behind home NATs. This is the case for instance when home surveillance cameras running as RTSP servers intend to stream video to cell phone users in the public address realm through a home NAT.

The first priority should be to solve the RTSP NAT traversal problem for RTSP servers deployed in the open.

The list of feature requirements for RTSP NAT solutions are given below:

1. MUST work for all flavors of NATs, including symmetric NATs
2. MUST work for firewalls (subject to pertinent firewall administrative policies), including those with ALGs
3. SHOULD have minimal impact on clients in the open and not dual-hosted

- For instance, no extra delay from RTSP connection till arrival of media
- 4. SHOULD be simple to use/implement/administer that people actually turn them on
 - Otherwise people will resort to TCP tunneling through NATs
 - Address discovery for NAT traversal should take place behind the scene, if possible
- 5. SHOULD authenticate dual-hosted client transport handler to prevent DDOS attacks

4. Detecting the loss of NAT mappings

Several of the NAT traversal techniques in the next chapter use the fact that the NAT UDP mapping's external address and port can be discovered. This information is then utilized to direct the traffic intended for the local side's address to the external instead. However any such information is only valid while the mapping is intact. As the IAB's UNSAF document [18] points out, the mapping can either timeout or change its properties. It is therefore important for the NAT traversal solutions to handle the loss or change of NAT mappings, according to UNSAF.

First, it is important to ensure that there exists the possibility to send keep-alive traffic to minimize the probability of timeout. The difficulty is that the timeout timer can have varying length between different NATs. That is the reason why that UNSAF recommends usage of STUN to determine this timeout.

Secondly, it is possible to detect and recover from the situation where the mapping has been changed or removed. The possibility to detect a lost mapping is based on the fact that no traffic will arrive. Below we will give some recommendation on how to detect loss of NAT mappings when using RTP/RTCP under RTSP control.

For RTP session there is normally a need to have both RTP and RTCP functioning. The loss of a RTP mapping can only be detected when expected traffic does not arrive. If no data arrives after having issued a PLAY request and received the 200 response, one can normally expect to receive RTP packets within a few seconds. However, for a receiver to be certain to detect the case where no RTP traffic was delivered due to NAT trouble, one should monitor the RTCP Sender reports. The sender report carries a field telling how many packets the server has sent. If that has increased and no RTP packets has arrived for a few seconds it is very likely the RTP mapping has been removed.

The loss of mapping carrying RTCP is simpler to detect. As RTCP is normally sent periodically in each direction, even during the RTSP ready state, if RTCP packets are missing for several RTCP intervals, the mapping is likely to be lost. Note that if no RTCP

packets are received by the RTSP server for a while, the RTSP server has the option to delete the corresponding SSRC and RTSP session ID, which means either the client could not get through a middle box NAT/FW, or that the client is mal-functioning.

5. NAT Traversal Techniques

There exist a number of NAT traversal techniques that can be used to allow RTSP to traverse NATs. However they have different features, they are applicable to different topologies; and the cost is also different. They also differ in their security considerations. In the following sections, each technique is outlined in details in terms of its advantages.

Not all of the techniques are yet described in the full details needed to actually use this document as a specification for how to use them. These sections are included to present comparison amongst the different methods in order for one to identify the most suitable method for a particular RTSP deployment scenario. There are methods that use protocols in early stage of standardization, such as TURN and ICE.

5.1. STUN

5.1.1. Introduction

STUN - "Simple Traversal of UDP Through Network Address Translators" [6] is a standardized protocol developed by the MIDCOM WG that allows a client to use secure means to discover the presence of a NAT between himself and the STUN server and the type of that NAT. The client then uses the STUN server to discover the address bindings assigned by the NAT. The protocol also allows discovery of the mappings timeout period and can be used in any keep-alive mechanism.

STUN is a client-server protocol. STUN client sends a request to a STUN server and the server returns a response. There are two types of STUN requests - Binding Requests, sent over UDP, and Shared Secret Requests, sent over TLS over TCP. We note here that for RTSP clients running on embedded devices, it may not be practical to require TLS be implemented on the embedded device (such as a cell phone). Therefore in the next section we propose to adapt RFC 3489 ([6]) so as to let RTSP use a subset of STUN packets/features for NAT traversal, but without requiring full implementation of STUN in an RTSP server or RTSP client. We note that RFC 3489 has provisions for STUN to be embedded in another application (see section 6 of [6]).

5.1.1.2. Using STUN to traverse NAT without server modifications

This section describes how a client can use STUN to traverse NATs to RTSP servers without requiring server modifications. However this method has limited applicability and requires the server to be available in the external/public address realm in regards to the client located behind a NAT(s).

Limitations:

- The server must be located in either a public address realm or the next hop external address realm in regards to the client.
- The client may only be located behind NATs that are of the full cone, address restricted, or port restricted type. Clients behind symmetric NATs cannot use this method.

Method:

A RTSP client using RTP transport over UDP can use STUN to traverse a full cone NAT(s) in the following way:

1. Use STUN to discover the type of NAT, if any, and the timeout period for any UDP mapping on the NAT. This is RECOMMENDED to be performed in the background as soon as IP connectivity is established. If this is performed prior to establishing a streaming session the possible delays in the session establishment will be reduced. If no NAT is detected, normal SETUP SHOULD be used.
2. The RTSP client determines the number of UDP ports needed by counting the number of needed media transport protocols sessions in the multi-media presentation. This information is available in the media description protocol, e.g. SDP. For example, each RTP session will in general require two UDP ports, one for RTP, and one for RTCP.
3. For each UDP port required, establish a mapping and discover the public/external IP address and port number with the help of the STUN server. If successful a mapping has been established:
clients local address/port <-> public address/port.
4. Perform the RTSP SETUP for each media. In the transport header the following parameter SHOULD be included with the given values: "dest_addr" with the public/external IP address and port pair for both RTP and RTCP. To allow this to work servers MUST allow a client to setup the RTP stream on any port, not only even ports. The server SHOULD respond with a transport header containing an "src_addr" parameter with the RTP and

RTCP source IP address and port of the media stream.

5. To keep the mappings alive, the client SHOULD periodically send UDP traffic over all mappings needed for the session. STUN MAY be used to determine the timeout period of the NAT(s) UDP mappings. For the mapping carrying RTCP traffic the periodic RTCP traffic may be enough. For mappings carrying RTP traffic and for mappings carrying RTCP packets not frequent enough, keep alive messages SHOULD be sent. As keep alive messages, empty IP/UDP messages SHOULD be sent to the streaming servers discard port (port number 9).

If a UDP mapping is lost then the above discovery process is required to be performed again. The media stream needs to be SETUP again to change the transport parameters to the new ones. This will likely cause a glitch in media playback.

To allow UDP packets to arrive from the server to a client behind a restricted NAT, some UDP packets must first be sent to the server. The client, before sending a RTSP PLAY request, must send an empty or small UDP message, on each mapping, to the IP address given as the servers source address. To create minimum problems for the server these UDP packets SHOULD be sent to the server's discard port (port number 9) and contain no or very little data. To ensure that at least one UDP message passes the NAT, several messages are recommended to be sent.

For a port restricted NAT the client must send messages to the exact ports used by the server to send UDP packets before sending a RTSP PLAY request. This makes it possible to use the above described process with the following additional restrictions: For each port mapping, UDP packets needs to be sent first to the servers source address/port. To minimize potential effects on the server from these messages the following type of messages MUST be sent. RTP: An empty or less than 12 bytes large UDP message. RTCP: A correctly formed RTCP message.

The above described adaptations for restricted NATs will not work unless the server includes the "src_addr" "Transport" header parameter.

5.1.3. Embedding STUN in RTSP

This section outlines the adaptation and embedding of STUN within RTSP. This enables STUN to be used to traverse any type of NAT, including symmetric NATs. Any protocol changes are beyond the scope of this memo and is instead defined in TBD internet draft.

Limitations:

This NAT traversal solution (using STUN with RTSP) has limitations:

1. It does not work if both RTSP client and RTSP server are behind separate NATs.
2. The RTSP server may, for security reasons, refuse to send media streams to an IP different from the IP in the client RTSP requests. Therefore, if the client is behind a NAT that has multiple public addresses, and the client's RTSP port and UDP port are mapped to different IP addresses, RTSP SETUP will fail.

Deviations from STUN as defined in RFC 3489

Specifically, we differ from RFC3489 in two aspects:

1. We allow RTSP applications to have the option to perform "binding discovery" without authentication;
2. We require STUN server be co-located on RTSP server's media ports.

In order to allow binding discovery without authentication, the STUN server embedded in RTSP application would ignore authentication tag, and the STUN client embedded in RTSP application would use dummy authentication tag, as well.

In order to use STUN to solve NAT traversal when RTSP client is behind a symmetric NAT, STUN server must co-locate on RTSP server's media ports. This can be done, for instance, by embedding STUN server in RTSP server.

In fact, if STUN server is indeed co-located with RTSP server's media port, then a RTSP client using RTP transport over UDP can use STUN to traverse ALL types of NATs that have been defined in section 3.1. In the case of symmetric NAT, the party inside the NAT must initiate UDP traffic. The STUN Bind Request, being a UDP packet itself, can serve as the traffic initiating packet. Subsequently, both the STUN Binding Response packets and the RTP/RTCP packets can traverse the NAT, regardless of whether the RTSP server or the RTSP client is behind NAT.

Likewise, if a RTSP server is behind a NAT, then an embedded STUN server must co-locate on the RTSP client's RTCP port. In this case, we assume that the client has some means to establish TCP connection to the RTSP server behind NAT so as to exchange RTSP messages with the RTSP server.

To minimize delay, we require that the RTSP server supporting this option must inform its client the RTP and RTCP ports that the server intend to send RTP and RTCP packets, respectively.

To minimize the keep-alive traffic for address mapping, we also require that the RTSP end-point (server or client) sends and receives RTCP packets from the same port.

5.1.4. Discussion On Co-located STUN Server

In order to use STUN to traverse symmetric NATs the STUN server needs to be co-located with the streaming server media ports, i.e., the port from which RTP packets will be sent. This creates a de-multiplexing problem: we must be able to differentiate a STUN packet from a media packet. This will be done based on heuristics. This works fine between STUN and RTP or RTCP where the first byte has always present difference, but this can't be guaranteed to work with other media protocols.

5.1.5. ALG considerations

If a NAT supports RTSP ALG (Application Level Gateway) and is not aware of the STUN traversal option, service failure may happen, because a client discovers its public IP address and port numbers, and inserts them in its SETUP requests, when the RTSP ALG processes the SETUP request it may change the destination and port number, resulting in unpredictable behavior.

5.1.6. Deployment Considerations

For the non-embedded usage of STUN the following applies:

Advantages:

- Using STUN does not require RTSP server modifications; it only affects the client implementation.

Transition:

The usage of STUN can be phased out gradually as the first step of a STUN capable machine can be to check the presence of NATs for the presently used network connection. The removal of STUN capability in the client implementations will however most probably wait until no need at all exists to use STUN.

For the Embedded STUN method the following applies:

Advantages:

- STUN is a solution first used by SIP applications. As shown above, with little or no changes, RTSP application can re-use STUN as a NAT traversal solution, avoiding the pit-fall of solving a problem twice.
- STUN has built-in message authentication features, which makes it more secure. See next section for an in-depth security discussion.
- This solution works as long as there is only one RTSP end point in the private address realm, regardless of the NAT's type. There may even be multiple NATs (see figure 1 in [6]).
- Compares to other UDP based NAT traversal methods in this document, STUN requires little new protocol development (since STUN is already a IETF standard), and most likely less implementation effort, since open source STUN server and client have become available [21]. There is the need to embed STUN in RTSP server and client, which require a de-multiplexer between STUN packets and RTP/RTCP packets. There is also a need to register the proper feature tags.

Transition:

The usage of STUN can be phased out gradually as the first step of a STUN capable machine can be to check the presence of NATs for the presently used network connection. The removal of STUN capability in the client implementations will however most probably wait until there is no need at all to use STUN.

5.1.7. Security Considerations

To prevent RTSP server being used as Denial of Service (DoS) attack tools the RTSP Transport header parameter "destination" and "dest_addr" are generally not allowed to point to any IP address other than the one that RTSP message originates from. The RTSP server is only prepared to make an exception of this rule when the client is trusted (e.g., through the use of a secure authentication process, or through some secure method of challenging the destination to verify its willingness to accept the UDP traffic). Such restriction means that STUN does not work for NATs that would assign different IP addresses to different UDP flows on its public side. Therefore most multi-addressed NATs will not work with STUN.

In terms of security property, STUN combined with destination address restricted RTSP has the same security properties as the core RTSP. It is protected from being used as a DoS attack tool unless the attacker has ability to hijack RTSP stream.

Using STUN's support for message authentication and secure transport of RTSP messages, attackers cannot modify STUN responses or RTSP messages to change media destination. This protects against hijacking, however as a client can be the initiator of an attack, these mechanisms cannot securely prevent RTSP servers being used as DoS attack tools.

5.2. ICE

5.2.1. Introduction

ICE (Interactive Connectivity Establishment) [9] is a methodology for NAT traversal that is under development for SIP. The basic idea is to try, in a parallel fashion, all possible connection addresses that an end point may have. This allows the end-point to use the best available UDP "connection" (meaning two UDP end-points capable of reaching each other). The methodology has very nice properties in that basically all NAT topologies are possible to traverse.

Here is how ICE works. End point A collects all possible address that can be used, including local IP addresses, STUN derived

addresses, TURN addresses. On each local port that any of these address and port pairs leads to, a STUN server is installed. This STUN server only accepts STUN requests using the correct authentication through the use of username and password.

End-point A then sends a request to establish connectivity with end-point B, which includes all possible ways to get the media through to A. Note that each of A's published address/port pairs has a STUN server co-located. B, before responding to A, uses a STUN client to try to reach all the address and port pairs specified by A. The destinations for which the STUN requests have successfully completed are then indicated. If bi-directional communication is intended the end-point B must then in its turn offer A all its reachable address and port pairs, which then are tested by A.

If B fails to get any STUN response from A, all hope is not lost. Certain NAT topologies require multiple tries from both ends before successful connectivity is accomplished. The STUN requests may also result in that more connectivity alternatives are discovered and conveyed in the STUN responses.

This chapter is not yet a full technical solution. It is mostly a feasibility study on how ICE could be applied to RTSP and what properties it would have. One nice thing about ICE for RTSP is that it does make it possible to deploy RTSP server behind NAT/FIRWALL, a desirable option to some RTSP applications.

5.2.2. Using ICE in RTSP

The usage of ICE for RTSP requires that both client and server be updated to include the ICE functionality. If both parties implement the necessary functionality the following step-by-step algorithm could be used to accomplish connectivity for the UDP traffic.

This assumes that it is possible to establish a TCP connection for the RTSP messages between the client and the server. This is not trivial in scenarios where the server is located behind a NAT, and may require some TCP ports been opened, or the deployment of proxies, etc.

Refer to [22] for the mapping of ICE to RTSP.

5.2.3. Implementation burden of ICE

The usage of ICE will require that a number of new protocols and new RTSP/SDP features be implemented. This makes ICE the solution that has the largest impact on client and server implementations amongst all the NAT/FW traversal methods in this document.

- Some RTSP server implementation requirements are:
 - Full STUN server features
 - limited STUN client features
 - Dynamic SDP generation with more parameters.
 - RTSP error code for ICE extension

Some client implantation requirements are:

- Limited STUN server features
- Limited STUN client features
- RTSP error code and ICE extension

5.2.4. Deployment Considerations

Advantages:

- Solves NAT connectivity discovery for basically all cases as long as a TCP connection between them can be established in the first hand. This includes servers behind NATs. (Note that a proxy between address domains may be required to get TCP through).
- Improves defenses against DDOS attacks as media receiving client requires authentications, via STUN on its media reception ports. See [22] for more details.

5.3. Symmetric RTP

5.3.1. Introduction

Symmetric RTP is a NAT traversal solution that is based on requiring NATed clients to send UDP packets to the server's media send ports. In core RTSP, usage of RTP over UDP is uni-directional, where the server sends RTP packets to client's RTP port. Symmetric RTP is similar to connection-oriented traffic, where one side (e.g., the RTSP client) first "connects" by sending a RTP packet to the other side's RTP port, the recipient then replies to the originating IP and port.

Specifically, when the RTSP server receives the "connect" RTP packet from its client, it copies the source IP and Port number and uses them as delivery address for media packets. By having the server send media traffic back the same way as the client's packet are sent to the server, address mappings will be honored. Therefore this technique has the advantage of working for all types of NATs. However, it does require server modifications. Symmetric RTP is somewhat more vulnerable to hijacking attacks, which will be explained in more details in the section discussing security concerns.

5.3.2. Necessary RTSP extensions

To support symmetric RTP the RTSP signaling must be extended to allow the RTSP client to indicate that it will use symmetric RTP. The client also needs to be able to signal its RTP SSRC to the server in its SETUP request. The RTP SSRC is used to establish some basic level of security against hijacking attacks. Care must be taken in choosing client's RTP SSRC. First, it must be unique within all the RTP sessions belonging to the same RTSP session. Secondly, if the RTSP server is sending out media packets to multiple clients from the same send port, the RTP SSRC needs to be unique amongst those clients' RTP sessions. Recognizing that there is a potential that RTP SSRC collision may occur, the RTSP server must be able to signal to client that a collision has occurred and that it wants the client to use a different RTP SSRC carried in the SETUP response.

Details of the RTSP extension are beyond the scope of this draft and will be defined in a TBD RTSP extension draft.

5.3.3. Deployment Considerations

Advantages:

- Works for all types of NATs, including those using multiple IP addresses.
- Have no interaction problems with any RTSP ALG changing the client's information in the transport header.

5.3.4. Security Consideration

Symmetric RTP's major security issue is that RTP streams can be hijacked and directed towards any target that the attacker desires. The method has also no protection if client desires to initiate media streams to a target to launch DDOS attacks.

The most serious security problem is the deliberate attack with the use of a RTSP client and symmetric RTP. The attacker uses RTSP to setup a media session. Then it uses symmetric RTP with a spoofed source address of the intended target of the attack. There is no defense against this attack other than restricting the possible bind address to be the same as the RTSP connection arrived on. This prevents symmetric RTP to be used with multi-address NATs.

The hijack attack can be performed in various ways. The basic attack is based on the ability to read the RTSP signaling packets in order to learn the address and port the server will send from and also the SSRC the client will use. Having this information the attacker can send its own RTP packets containing the correct RTP SSRC to the correct address and port on the server. The

destination of the packets is set as the source IP and port in these RTP packets.

Another variation of this attack is to modify the RTP binding packet being sent to the server by simply changing the source IP to the target one desires to attack.

One can protect oneself against the first attack by applying encryption to the RTSP signaling transport. However, the second variation is impossible to defend against. As a NAT re-writes the source IP and port this cannot be authenticated, which is required in order to protect against this type of DOS attack.

The random SSRC tag in the binding packet determines how well symmetric RTP can fend off streaming hijacking performed by parties that are not "men-in-the-middle". This proposal uses the 32-bit RTP SSRC field to this effect. Therefore it is important that this field is derived with a non-predictive randomizer. It should not be possible by knowing the algorithm used and a couple of basic facts, to derive what random number a certain client will use.

An attacker not knowing the SSRC but aware of which port numbers that a server sends from can deploy a brute force attack on the server by testing a lot of different SSRCs until it finds a matching one. Therefore a server SHOULD implement functionality that blocks ports that receive multiple binding packets with different invalid SSRCs, especially when they are coming from the same IP/Port.

To improve the security against attackers the random tags length could be increased. To achieve a longer random tag while still using RTP and RTCP, it will be necessary to develop RTP and RTCP payload formats for carrying the random tag.

5.4. Application Level Gateways

5.4.1. Introduction

An Application Level Gateway (ALG) reads the application level messages and performs necessary changes to allow the protocol to work through the middle box. However this behavior has some problems in regards to RTSP:

1. It does not work when the RTSP protocol is used with end-to-end security. As the ALG can't inspect and change the application level messages the protocol will fail due to the middle box.

2. ALGs need to be updated if extensions to the protocol are added. Due to deployment issues with changing ALG's this may also break the end-to-end functionality of RTSP.

Due to the above reasons it is NOT RECOMMENDED to use an RTSP ALG in NATs. This is especially important for NAT's targeted to home users and small office environments, since it is very hard to upgrade NAT's deployed in home or SOHO (small office/home office) environment.

5.4.2. Guidelines On Writing ALGs for RTSP

In this section, we provide a step-by-step guideline on how one should go about writing an ALG to enable RTSP to traverse a NAT.

1. Detect any SETUP request.
2. Try to detect the usage of any of the NAT traversal methods that replace the address and port of the Transport header parameters "destination" or "dest_addr". If any of these methods are used, the ALG SHOULD NOT change the address. Ways to detect that these methods are used are:
 - For embedded STUN, watch for the feature tag "nat.stun". If any of those exists in the "supported", "proxy-require", or "require" headers of the RTSP exchange.
 - For non-embedded STUN and TURN based solutions: This can in some case be detected by inspecting the "destination" or "dest_addr" parameter. If it contains either one of the NAT's external IP addresses or a public IP address. However if multiple NATs are used this detection may fail.

Otherwise continue to the next step.

3. Create UDP mappings (client given IP/port <-> external IP/port) where needed for all possible transport specification in the transport header of the request found in (1). Enter the public address and port(s) of these mappings in transport header. Mappings SHALL be created with consecutive public port number starting on an even number for RTP each stream. Mappings SHOULD also be given a long timeout period, at least 5 minutes.
4. When the SETUP response is received from the server the ALG MAY remove the unused UDP mappings, i.e. the ones not present in the transport header. The session ID SHOULD also be bound to the UDP mappings part of that session.
5. If SETUP response settles on RTP over TCP or RTP over RTSP as lower transport, do nothing: let TCP tunneling to take care of

NAT traversal. Otherwise go to next step.

6. The ALG SHOULD keep alive the UDP mappings belonging to the an RTSP session as long as: RTSP messages with the session's ID has been sent in the last timeout interval, or UDP messages are sent on any of the UDP mappings during the last timeout interval.
7. The ALG MAY remove a mapping as soon a TEARDOWN response has been received for that media stream.

5.4.3. Deployment Considerations

Advantage:

- No impact on either client or server
- Can work for any type of NATs

Transition:

An RTSP ALG will not be phased out in any automatically way. It must be removed, probably through the removal of the NAT it is associated with.

5.4.4. Security Considerations

An ALG will not work when deployment of end-to-end RTSP signaling security. Therefore deployment of ALG will result in that end-to-end security will not be used by clients located behind NATs.

5.5. TCP Tunneling

5.5.1. Introduction

Using a TCP connection that is established from the client to the server ensures that the server can send data to the client. The connection opened from the private domain ensures that the server can send data back to the client. To send data originally intended to be transported over UDP requires the TCP connection to support some type of framing of the RTP packets.

Using TCP also results in that the client has to accept that real-time performance may no longer be possible. TCP's problem of ensuring timely deliver was the reasons why RTP was developed. Problems that arise with TCP are: head-of-line blocking, delay introduced by retransmissions, highly varying congestion control.

5.5.2. Usage of TCP tunneling in RTSP

The RTSP core specification [7] supports interleaving of media data on the TCP connection that carries RTSP signaling. See section 10.13 in [7] for how to perform this type of TCP tunneling.

There is currently new work on one more way of transporting RTP over TCP in AVT and MMUSIC. For signaling and rules on how to establish the TCP connection in lieu of UDP, see [16]. Another draft describes how to frame RTP over the TCP connection is described in [17].

5.5.3. Deployment Considerations

Advantage:

- Works through all types of NATs where server is in the open.

Transition:

The tunneling over RTSP's TCP connection is not planned to be phased -out. It is intended to be a fallback mechanism and for usage when total media reliability is desired, even at the price of loss of real-time properties.

5.5.4. Security Considerations

The TCP tunneling of RTP has no known security problem besides those already present in RTSP. It is not possible to get any amplification effect that is desired for denial of service attacks due to TCP's flow control.

A possible security consideration, when session media data is interleaved with RTSP, would be the performance bottleneck when RTSP encryption is applied, since all session media data also needs to be encrypted.

5.6. TURN (Traversal Using Relay NAT)

5.6.1. Introduction

Traversal Using Relay NAT (TURN) [8] is a protocol for setting up traffic relays that allows clients behind NATs and firewalls to receive incoming traffic for both UDP and TCP. These relays are controlled and have limited resources. They need to be allocated before usage.

TURN allows a client to temporarily bind an address/port pair on the relay (TURN server) to its local source address/port pair, which is used to contact the TURN server. The TURN server will then forward packets between the two sides of the relay. To prevent DOS attacks on either recipient, the packets forwarded are restricted to the specific source address. On the client side it is restricted to the source setting up the mapping. On the external side this is limited to the source address/port pair of the first packet arriving on the binding. After the first packet has arrived the mapping is "locked down" to that address. Packets from any other source on this address will be discarded.

Using a TURN server makes it possible for a RTSP client to receive media streams from even an unmodified RTSP server. However the problem is that RTSP server may restrict that destinations other than the IP address that the RTSP message arrives from shall not be accepted. This means that TURN could only be used if the server knows and accepts that the IP belongs to a TURN server and the TURN server can't be targeted at an unknown address. Unfortunately TURN servers can be targeted at any host that has a public IP address by spoofing the source IP of TURN Allocation requests.

5.6.2. Usage of TURN with RTSP

To use a TURN server for NAT traversal, the following steps should be performed.

1. The RTSP client connects with RTSP server. The client retrieves the session description to determine the number of media streams.
2. The client establishes the necessary bindings on the TURN server. It must choose the local RTP and RTCP ports that it desires to receive media packets. TURN supports requesting bindings of even port numbers and continuous ranges.
3. The RTSP client uses the acquired address and port mappings in the RTSP SETUP request using the destination header. Note that the server is required to have a mechanism to verify that it is allowed to send media traffic to the given address. The server SHOULD include its RTP SSRC in the SETUP response.
4. Client requests that the Server starts playing. The server starts sending media packet to the given destination address and ports.
5. The first media packet to arrive at the TURN server on the external port causes "lock down"; then TURN server forwards the media packets to the RTSP client.

6. When media arrives at the client, the client should try to verify that the media packets are from the correct RTSP server, by matching the RTP SSRC of the packet. Source IP address of this packet will be that of the TURN server and can therefore not be used to verify that the correct source has caused lock down.
7. If the client notices that some other source has caused lock down on the TURN server, the client should create new bindings and change the session transport parameters to reflect the new bindings.
8. If the client pauses and media are not sent for about 75% of the mapping timeout the client should use TURN to refresh the bindings.

5.6.3. Deployment Considerations

Advantages:

- Does not require any server modifications.
- Works for any types of NAT as long as the server has public reachable IP address.

Transition:

TURN is not intended to be phase-out completely, see chapter 11.2 of [8]. However the usage of TURN could be reduced when the demand for having NAT traversal is reduced.

5.6.4. Security Considerations

An eavesdropper of RTSP messages between the RTSP client and RTSP server will be able to do a simple denial of service attack on the media streams by sending messages to the destination address and port present in the RTSP SETUP messages. If the attacker's message can reach the TURN server before the RTSP server's message, the lock down can be accomplished towards some other address. This will result in that the TURN server will drop all the media server's packets when they arrive. This can be accomplished with little risk for the attacker of being caught, as it can be performed with a spoofed source IP. The client may detect this attack when it receives the lock down packet sent by the attacker as being mal-formatted and not corresponding to the expected context. It will also notice the lack of incoming packets. See bullet 7 in section 5.6.2.

The TURN server can also become part of a denial of service attack towards any victim. To perform this attack the attacker must be able to eavesdrop on the packets from the TURN server towards a target for the DOS attack. The attacker uses the TURN server to setup a RTSP session with media flows going through the TURN server. The attacker is in fact creating TURN mappings towards a target by spoofing the source address of TURN requests. As the attacker will need the address of these mappings he must be able to eavesdrop or intercept the TURN responses going from the TURN server to the target. Having these addresses, he can set up a RTSP session and starts delivery of the media. The attacker must be able to create these mappings. The attacker in this case may be traced by the TURN username in the mapping requests.

The first attack can be made very hard by applying transport security for the RTSP messages, which will hide the TURN servers address and port numbers from any eavesdropper.

The second attack requires that the attacker have access to a user account on the TURN server to be able set up the TURN mappings. To prevent this attack the server shall verify that the target destination accept this media stream.

6. Firewalls

Firewalls exist for the purpose of protecting a network from traffic not desired by the firewall owner. Therefore it is a policy decision if a firewall will let RTSP and its media streams through or not. RTSP is designed to be firewall friendly in that it should be easy to design firewall policies to permit passage of RTSP traffic and its media streams.

The firewall will need to allow the media streams associated with a RTSP session pass through it. Therefore the firewall will need an ALG that reads RTSP SETUP and TEARDOWN messages. By reading the SETUP message the firewall can determine what type of transport and from where the media streams will use. Commonly there will be the need to open UDP ports for RTP/RTCP. By looking at the source and destination addresses and ports the opening in the firewall can be minimized to the least necessary. The opening in the firewall can be closed after a teardown message for that session or the session itself times out.

Simpler firewalls do allow a client to receive media as long as it has sent packets to the target. Depending on the security level this can have the same behavior as a full cone NAT or a Symmetric NAT. The only difference is that no address translation is done. To be able to use such a firewall a client would need to implement one of the above described NAT traversal methods that include sending packets to the server to open up the mappings.

7. Open Issues

Some open issues with this draft:

- At some point we need to recommend one RTSP NAT solution so as to ensure implementations can inter-operate. This decision will require that requirements, security and desired goals are evaluated against implementation cost and the probability to get the final solution deployed.
- The ALG recommendations need to be improved and clarified.
- The firewall RTSP ALG recommendations need to be written as they are different from the NAT ALG in some perspectives.

8. Security Consideration

In preceding sessions we have discussed security merits of each and every NAT/FW traversal methods for RTSP. In summary, the presence of NAT(s) is a security risk, as a client cannot perform source authentication of its IP address. This prevents the deployment of any future RTSP extensions providing security against hijacking of sessions by a man-in-the-middle.

Each of these has security implications.

Using STUN will provide the same level of security as RTSP with out transport level security and source authentications; as long as the server does not grant a client request to send media to different IP addresses.

Using symmetric RTP will have a slightly higher risk of session hijacking than normal RTSP. The reason is that there exists a probability that an attacker is able to guess the random tag that the client uses to prove its identity when creating the address bindings.

The usage of an RTSP ALG does not increase in itself the risk for session hijacking. However the deployment of ALGs as sole mechanism for RTSP NAT traversal will prevent deployment of encrypted end-to-end RTSP signaling.

The usage of TCP tunneling has no known security problems. However it might provide a bottleneck when it comes to end-to-end RTSP signaling security if TCP tunneling is used on a interleaved RTSP signaling connection.

The usage of TURN has high risk of denial of service attacks against a client. The TURN server can also be used as a redirect

point in a DDOS attack unless the server has strict enough rules
for who may create bindings.

9. IANA Consideration

This specification does not define any protocol extensions hence
no IANA action is requested.

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Mapping ICE (Interactive Connectivity Establishment) to RTSP
<draft-zeng-mmusic-map-ice-rtsp-00.txt>

Status of this Memo

This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.

Abstract

This memo describes a mapping from ICE (Interactive Connectivity Establishment) to RTSP for the purpose of Network Address Translator (NAT) traversal for RTSP protocol. In order to become compatible with ICE, the Transport header in RTSP is extended with new syntax elements. This memo presents a few examples RTSP conversations that uses ICE for NAT/firewall traversals.

1. Introduction

ICE protocol is a proposed framework for NAT and firewall traversal.

In [1], the parameters for various ICE messages are defined in generic

XML syntax. Each multimedia signalling protocol needs to map these parameters to its own protocol parameters. Section 9 of [1] provides a mapping for SIP (Session Initiation Protocol) based on the SDP Offer/Answer model.

This memo provides a mapping for RTSP (Real-Time Streaming Protocol).

Unlike SIP, RTSP is a multimedia signalling protocol that does not follow the SDP Offer/Answer model defined in RFC3264, for historical reasons.

It is therefore necessary to extend the Transport header in RTSP with new syntax elements in order to fully implement ICE features.

The readers of this memo are expected to have read [1] (especially sections 5 and 9) and have gained a reasonable understand of ICE framework.

RTSP differs from SIP in that RTSP server and RTSP client are almost never deployed behind different NAT/firewalls at the same time. That is, either RTSP server or RTSP client is in the open.

The examples in this memo limit the traversal problem to

- 1) RTSP server in the open;
- 2) RTSP client in the open.

In such cases, TURN services are not required for connectivity establishment between RTSP server and client.

2. Mapping ICE to RTSP

2.1 How Does ICE Work For RTSP: an overview

The key assumption in ICE is that a signalling entity cannot know, apriori, whether the peer it wishes to communicate with is connected to one or all of the address realms it is in. Therefore, in order to communicate, it has to try them all, and choose the best one that works. This assumption is true for RTSP.

As described in figure 1, section 2 of [1], in terms of signalling model for RTSP, the initiator is the RTSP client, the responder is the RTSP server, the initiate message is a SETUP message, and the accept message is a SETUP response. The modify message is a SETUP message, and the modify acceptance message is a SETUP response.

It is also an option to treat the DESCRIBE response from RTSP server to RTSP client as another initiate message in the ICE context. For RTSP, DESCRIBE response normally carries the session description in SDP format. It is in this SDP that the RTSP server may use the SDP extension in section 9 of [1] to inform its client of the addresses, ports and associated parameters (e.g., user name, password) that the server has discovered. However, since not all RTSP sessions begin with DESCRIBE (many rely on ftp or HTTP protocols to obtain session descriptions out of band), in the rest of this memo, we will only consider SETUP as the initiate message, even though starting ICE process with DESCRIBE response can save up to one round of ICE negotiations.

Here is how ICE would work with RTSP.

Before the RTSP client establishes a session, it obtains as many IP address and port combinations in as many address realms as it can. Any protocol that provides a client with an IP address and port on which the RTSP client can receive traffic can be used. These include STUN and even VPN. The RTSP client also uses any local interface addresses. A dual-stack v4/v6 client will obtain both a v6 and a v4 address/port. The only requirement is that, across all of these addresses, the RTSP client can be certain that at least one of them will work for any responder it might communicate with. This is guaranteed by:

- 1) The assumption that the RTSP client and server are separated by at most one level of NAT/firewall;
- 2) The assumption that co-located STUN servers can be installed on the media ports in each protocol entity.

The RTSP client then makes a STUN server available on each of the address/port combinations it has obtained. This STUN server is

running locally, on the initiator. All of these addresses are placed into the Transport header of the SETUP request and they are ordered in terms of preference given in [1]. The SETUP request also conveys the STUN username and password which are required to gain access to the STUN server on each address/port combination. Transport header extensions are described in the next section to convey username and password.

The initiate message -- the SETUP request, is sent to the responder (normally RTSP server) via the RTSP connection, preferably using a secure protocol such as TLS.

Once the RTSP server receives the SETUP request, it sends STUN requests to each alternate address/

port in the Transport. These STUN requests include the username and password obtained from the initiate message. The STUN requests serve two purposes. The first is to check for connectivity. If a response is received, the RTSP server knows that it can reach the client at that address. The second purpose is to obtain more addresses at which the RTSP server can be contacted. If the client is behind a NAT, the RTSP server may discover another address through the STUN responses. In its accept message -- 200 OK Setup response, the RTSP server includes all addresses that it can unilaterally determine (just as the client did), in addition to any that were discovered using the STUN messages to the RTSP client.

When the accept message arrives at the RTSP client, the client performs a similar operation. Using STUN, it checks connectivity to each of the addresses in the accept message. Through the STUN responses, it may learn of additional addresses that it can use to receive media. If it does learn any new address, the client generates a modify message to pass this address to the RTSP server. For RTSP, modify message is re-SETUP request. The RTSP server processes the re-SETUP request as a "ICE Modify" message and sends a "200 OK" SETUP response as the "ICE Modify response" message.

At this point, ICE process is complete, or else connection cannot be established.

2.1 Extending RTSP Transport Header Syntax

In order to convey username and password used to access colocated STUN servers, it is necessary to extend the RTSP Transport header definitions in [4].

```

Transport          = "Transport" ":" 1#transport-spec
transport-spec     = transport-id *parameter
transport-id       = transport-protocol "/" profile
                    [ "/" lower-transport ]
                    ; no LWS is allowed inside transport-id
transport-protocol = "RTP" / token
profile            = "AVP" / token
lower-transport    = "TCP" / "UDP" / token
parameter          = ";" ( "unicast" / "multicast" )
                    ...
                    / ";" "dest_addr" "=" addr-list
                    / ";" "src_addr" "=" addr-list
                    / ";" "username" "=" non-ws-string
                    / ";" "password" "=" non-ws-string
                    ; the above two are new parameters for ICE
                    / ";" trn-parameter-extension

```

3. Terminology

Several new terms are introduced in [1] and elaborated in this memo:

Session Initiator: A software entity that, at the request of a user, tries to establish communications with another entity, called the session responder. A session initiator is also called an initiator. In RTSP context, initiator is normally the RTSP client.

Initiator: Another term for a session initiator.

Session Responder: A software entity that receives a request for establishment of communications from the session initiator, and either accepts or declines the request. A session responder is also called a responder. In RTSP context, a session responder is normally the RTSP server.

Responder: Another term for a session responder.

Initiate Message: The signaling message used by an initiator to establish communications. It contains capabilities and other information needed by the responder to send media to the initiator.

Accept Message: The signaling message used by a responder to agree to communications. It contains capabilities and other information needed by the initiator to send media to the responder.

Modify Message: The signaling message used by either an initiator or responder to change the capability and other information needed by the peer for sending media.

Modify Acceptance Message: The signaling message used by a client to

agree to the changes proposed in a modify message, and to present the capability or other information needed by its peer for sending media.

Protocol Entity: either side of the media stream. For RTSP, a protocol entity is either the RTSP server or the RTSP client.

Terminate Message The signaling message used by a client to terminate the session and associated media streams.

Transport Address: The combination of an IP address and port.

Local Transport Address: A local transport address is transport address that has been allocated from the operating system on the host. This includes transport addresses obtained through VPNs, and also transport addresses obtained through RSIP (which lives at the operating system level). Transport addresses are typically obtained by binding to an interface.

Derived Transport Address: A derived transport address is a transport address which is associated with, but different from, a local transport address. The derived transport address is associated with the local transport address in that packets sent to the derived transport address are received on the socket bound to that local transport address. Derived addresses are obtained using protocols like STUN and TURN, and more generally, any UNSAF protocol [11].

4. Example RTSP Conversations

The examples below follow the RTSP ABNF rules in [4]. It is worth

noting that some of the syntax elements, such as "dest_addr" and "src_addr", are new to [4], and were not in RFC2326.

4.1 Case 1: RTSP server is in the open; client behind cone NAT

The following sample RTSP conversation describes how ICE traverses a "cone" NAT on behalf of an RTSP client behind NAT. In this example, RTSP server is in the public address realm, which is true for most RTSP service deployment to-date.

Recall from [5] the definition of cone NATs:

Full Cone: A full cone NAT is one where all requests from the same internal IP address and port are mapped to the same external IP address and port. Furthermore, any external host can send a packet to the internal host, by sending a packet to the mapped external address.

Restricted Cone: A restricted cone NAT is one where all requests from the same internal IP address and port are mapped to the same external IP address and port. Unlike a full cone NAT, an external host (with IP address X) can send a packet to the internal host only if the internal host had previously sent a packet to IP address X.

We assume that the RTSP client behind this cone NAT obtains its external IP (i.e., 24.2.1.1) and port apriori, using a public STUN server. The RTSP client's first SETUP request includes two choices of addresses for RTP/RTCP ports, as shown by the relevant RTSP conversation below:

```
C->S  SETUP rtsp://foo.com/test.wav/streamid=0 RTSP/1.0
      Transport: RTP/AVP/UDP;unicast;src_addr="172.16.1.1:6970"/
      "172.16.1.1:6971"; username="foo";
password="x",
      RTP/AVP/UDP;unicast;src_addr="24.2.1.1:9970"/
      "24.2.1.1:9980"; username="server";
password="s"
      CSeq: 2

S->C  RTSP/1.0 200 OK
      Transport: RTP/AVP/UDP;unicast;dest_addr="24.2.1.1:9970"/
      "24.2.1.1:9980"; src_addr="24.2.8.8:5540"/
      "24.2.8.8:5541"; username="client";
password="c"
      CSeq: 2
      Session: 2034820394
```

Comments: in the first SETUP request message, there are two transport specifications, separated by a comma as per [4].

The first transport uses local address and port, while the second uses STUN

discovered public address and port. In the 200 OK response, the presence of "dest_addr" parameter indicates that RTSP server has completed its ICE process after successful STUN bindings.

Finally RTSP client performs STUN bindings against the RTSP server using the "src_addr", username and password in the SETUP request, and receives STUN responses.

In this example, connectivity is established in only one round of ICE negotiation, thanks to the fact that STUN binding is performed appropi.

A nice benefit is that RTSP conversational delay is not increased by much. But connectivity may not always be established in one SETUP / Response cycle. In the case of symetric NAT, STUN binding must be done during RTSP conversations, not before, as shown by the next example.

4.2 Case 2: RTSP server is in the open; client behind Symetric NAT

In this case, obtaining external IP address and port appropi is of no value, given the symetric nature of the NAT. Therefore, the RTSP client does not list any public address in its first SETUP request.

```
C->S  SETUP rtsp://foo.com/test.wav/streamid=0 RTSP/1.0
      Transport: RTP/AVP/UDP;unicast;src_addr="172.16.1.1:6970"/
              "172.16.1.1:6971"; username="foo"; password="x"
      CSeq: 2
```

/* RTSP server cannot reach "172.16.1.1". The server's STUN binding request will timeout, and it then sends the following response. The lesson here is that STUN binding timeout should be set to a fairly short value so as to minimize the impact on RTSP delay. */

```
S->C  RTSP/1.0 200 OK
      Transport: RTP/AVP/UDP;unicast; src_addr="24.2.8.8:5540"/
              "24.2.8.8:5541"; username="client";
password="c"
      CSeq: 2
      Session: 2034820394
```

/* RTSP client now performs STUN bindings and finds its external address/port pair as, say, "24.2.1.1:6970"/"24.2.1:6971", it then sends re-SETUP as ICE modify message: */

```
C->S  SETUP rtsp://foo.com/test.wav/streamid=0 RTSP/1.0
      Transport: RTP/AVP/UDP;unicast;src_addr="172.16.1.1:6970"/
              "172.16.1.1:6971"; username="foo"; password="x"
              RTP/AVP/UDP;unicast;src_addr="24.2.1.1:6970"/
              "24.2.1.1:6971"; username="server";
password="s"
      CSeq: 3
```

Session: 2034820394
/* RTSP server can reach 24.2.1.1. So it sends the following 200 OK:
*/

S->C RTSP/1.0 200 OK
Transport: RTP/AVP/UDP;unicast;dest_addr="24.2.1.1:6970"/
"24.2.1.1:6971"; src_addr="24.2.8.8:5540"/
"24.2.8.8:5541"; username="client";
password="c"
CSeq: 3
Session: 2034820394

Comments: RTSP SETUP delay has been increased in this case by two factors,

when compared to case 1:

- 1) STUN timeout after the first SETUP request is received by RTSP server.
- 2) Additoinal SETUP/response round trip.

Case 3: RTSP client is in the open, RTSP server is behind symetric NAT

In this scenario, client has only one address to include in its SETUP request.

C->S SETUP rtsp://foo.com/test.wav/streamid=0 RTSP/1.0
Transport: RTP/AVP/UDP;unicast;src_addr="24.2.1.1:6970"/
"24.2.1.1:6971"; username="server";
password="x"
CSeq: 2

/* RTSP server's STUN packets can reach "24.2.1.1" and discover its own external IP/port as 24.2.8.8/5540 and 24.2.8.8/5541 (RTCP). */

S->C RTSP/1.0 200 OK
Transport: RTP/AVP/UDP;unicast; dest_addr="24.2.1.1:6970"/
"24.2.1.1:6971"; src_addr="24.2.8.8:5540"/
"24.2.8.8:5541"; username="client";
password="c"
CSeq: 2
Session: 2034820394

Here no additional RTSP message exchange is needed.

5. Security Considerations

The sections titled "security considerations" in [1] and [4] covers all the security considerations relevant to this memo. No additional consideration is deemed necessary.

Normative References

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Using RTSP Announce to signal End Of Stream
draft-zeng-mmusic-01

Status of this Memo

This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.

Abstract

This document describes an extension RTSP method, ANNOUNCE, which extends the core RTSP protocol to enable one RTSP protocol entity to push various types of information to the other end. Such information may include session description or end of stream events.

The receiver of this RTSP request is expected to reply with 200 OK response.

Since ANNOUNCE represents an extension to the core RTSP protocol, a feature tag, "method.announce", is defined to facilitate capability negotiation using RTSP extension mechanism [RTSP_NEW].

Changes From Previous Version:

1. Replaced END_OF_STREAM method with "Announce" method
2. Added use case for "announce" method to convey SDP

1. Motivation

In the core RTSP protocol [RTSP_NEW], ANNOUNCE method is taken out. There are use cases that require ANNOUNCE method to convey session description. There is a need to make this functionality still available but in a way consistent to the extension mechanism in [RTSP_NEW].

Meanwhile, there is also a need to signal end of stream event from server to client, as detailed below.

In the core RTSP protocol [RTSP_NEW], an RTSP client relies on the media transport mechanism to signal end of stream.

When the media transport mechanism happens to be RTP over UDP, this is carried out by RTCP BYE packet [RTP_NEW]. In practice, there are some drawbacks with this approach:

1. When the server sends an RTCP BYE packet with its SSRC, the server is giving up the SSRC (see section 8.2 in [RTP_NEW]). The server would be required to switch to a new SSRC on a subsequent PLAY of the same media stream.

header Since server's SSRC is only communicated in the Transport
of SETUP
new response, the server would not have an opportunity to send a
value to
the player, and the client would have to discover the SSRC from
the incoming RTP packets.

2. RTCP BYE packet method does not offer a simple, gurranteed
method of delievering
an end-of-stream announcement.
3. RTCP BYE packet method does not offer the option to have a
single
aggregate
end-of-stream announcemnt for all media streams in the RTSP
session.
4. Section 6.3.7 of RFC3550 stipulates that an RTP sender cannot
send RTCP BYE
before leaving the RTP session if it has not already sent at
least one RTP or RTCP packet. This is a problem under
error conditions. Consider the case
where an RTP session has just started (i.e., RTSP PLAY has
been
successfully acknowledged with an RTSP 200 OK response), and
the
sender attempts to
retrieve media frames from its media source. The media source
fails to provide any media frame due to its internal error such
as file corruption. The sender should inform its receiver(s)
but it cannot send BYE packets.

The motivation to solve the above issues is particularly high for
unicast streaming applications that use RTSP over TCP in the control
plane, and RTP over UDP in the media transport.

There is also the desire to have an EOS (End Of Stream)
signalling mechanism
for non-RTP delivery. One such delivery is MPEG2 transport streams
used in the cable TV environment. In non-IP delivery environments,
the transport typically remains allocated even if no media is being
delivered. This
means that a client cannot watch for the server to close the
transport to signal the end of stream. Meanwhile, watching for the
incoming media to stop is unreliable. Short
timeouts can trigger a false end of media detection if the
media flow is temporarily delayed. Long timeouts introduce
unacceptable latencies. Clients are unable to distinguish
between a normal end of stream and an error condition that
resulted in the media delivery stopping.

We note that using TEARDOWN from server to client is not
appropriate because:

1. TEARDOWN is currently not allowed from server to
client [RTSP_NEW];

2. Even if TEARDOWN is made available in server to client direction, the definition of TEARDOWN requires that, if the request URI is aggregate, that the session must be de-allocated by the server.
There are RTSP applications that use SET_PARAMETER from client to server as the means to report session QoS statistics, but if server uses TEARDOWN on aggregate URL to signal end of stream, the client can no longer use SET_PARAMETER with a session header.
3. In general, RTSP, being a client-server protocol, should let client, not server to control session state. But TEARDOWN on aggregate URL will change session from PLAYING state to INIT state.

We note that using PAUSE from server to client is not appropriate either, because PAUSE will change the state of the RTSP session.

This memo proposes to define ANNOUNCE method to signal end of stream. ANNOUNCE method is a server to client RTSP request originally defined in RFC2326 but excluded from the core RTSP protocol due to lack of support [RTSP_NEW].

This memo defines ANNOUNCE as an extension to the core RTSP protocol [RTSP_NEW]. It presents ANNOUNCE method as a general mechanism for RTSP server to signal to its clients various events including end of stream events or session description update events, among others. This memo will discuss the general usage of ANNOUNCE as well.

3. The Definition of ANNOUNCE method

[RTSP_NEW] clearly defines the mechanism to extend the core RTSP protocol. Following that mechanism, a feature tag is used to identify ANNOUNCE method as an extension to the core RTSP protocol.

ANNOUNCE method is a RTSP request that can be sent in both directions, either from client to server or server to client. When server intends to send ANNOUNCE to client, it must have already a transport mechanism available to reach the client, because the RTSP client is not required to keep a persistent connection with the RTSP server. It is beyond the scope of this memo to define the exact means for server to reach client. It is suffice to say that if the client intends to receive server's ANNOUNCE methods, it must keep the RTSP connection open, or inform the server on how to reach it without a persistent RTSP connection.

The purpose of RTSP ANNOUNCE method is to allow server or client to push different types of information to the other end. Such

information could be session description information, end of stream event or some type of error events, among others.

Here is an example in which an RTSP server announces end of stream event for a media stream using a non-aggregate URI.

```
S->C: ANNOUNCE rtsp://foo.com/bar.avi/streamid=0 RTSP/1.0
      CSeq: 10
      Session: 12345678
      Notice: End-Of-Stream
      Reason: 2000 End of range reached
      Range: npt=0-200
      RTP-Info: url=//foo.com/bar.avi/streamid=0;seq=45102

C->S: RTSP/1.0 200 OK
      CSeq: 10
      Session: 12345678
```

3.1 Normative definitions

"ANNOUNCE" is an "extension-method" in the ABNF in section 16.2 "RTSP Protocol Definitions" in [RTSP_NEW].

The request-URI of an ANNOUNCE request can be either aggregate or non-aggregate URI.

An ANNOUNCE request must include "CSeq" header. It MAY include the following optional headers:

"Range", "Session", "Reason", "RTP-Info"

An ANNOUNCE request MAY include entity body, in which case it MUST follow the rules for entity body defined in section 8.2 of [RTSP_NEW].

ANNOUNCE does NOT change RTSP session state.

3.2 New header for ANNOUNCE to signal end of stream

When ANNOUNCE is used for RTSP server to signal end of stream, it MUST include "CSeq", "Range" and "Session" headers.

It SHOULD include "RTP-Info" header.

The RTP-Info in server's END_OF_STREAM request is used to indicate the sequence number of the ending RTP packet for each media stream.

It MAY include a new RTSP header, the "Reason" header, defined in ABNF as:

```
Reason      = "Reason" ":" Reason-Phrase CRLF
```

where:

```
-- "Reason-Phrase" is a parameter defined in section 7.1.1 of
   [RTSP_NEW].
```

The purpose is to allow the server to explain why stream has ended.

Note that the server is free to use any text as "Reason-Phrase". In certain applications, the client may display the text, in its entirety, to end user to improve user friendliness.

3.3 Limitations on serve to client "ANNOUNCE" requests

Server to client ANNOUNCE method is issued only if the server has the means to contact the client when it has information to push. This may not be possible if the RTSP connection between server and client is not persistent. In such cases, the server will simply skip the sending of ANNOUNCE requests. That is to say, the server will not queue up the ANNOUNCE requests to be sent when client eventually connects. Such a queue would un-necessarily complicate server implementations.

4. Feature tag

The ANNOUNCE method is represented by a feature tag (see [RTSP_NEW] for how to use feature tags in capability negotiations).

The feature tag is:

method.announce

Implementations claiming "method.announce" feature tag MUST support the new "Reason" header defined in previous section.

5. Use Cases

This section presents some use cases of the ANNOUNCE method.

5.1 Client Announcing SDP To Server For Recording

This use case is the same as the first RTSP exchange presented in section 14.6 in RFC2326, with capability exchanged added via OPTIONS method.

The conference participant client C asks the media server M to record the audio and video portions of a meeting. The client uses the ANNOUNCE method to provide meta-information about the recorded session to the server; but first, it makes sure that "ANNOUNCE" feature is supported by the server.

```
C->M: OPTIONS * RTSP/1.0
      Require: method.announce
      CSeq: 1
```

```
M->C: RTSP/1.0 200 OK
      CSeq: 1
      Supported: method.announce
      Public: DESCRIBE, SETUP, TEARDOWN, PLAY, PAUSE,
RECORD, ANNOUNCE
```

C->M: ANNOUNCE rtsp://server.example.com/meeting RTSP/1.0
 CSeq: 90
 Content-Type: application/sdp
 Content-Length: 121

v=0
 o=cameral 3080117314 3080118787 IN IP4 195.27.192.36
 s=IETF Meeting, Munich - 1
 i=The thirty-ninth IETF meeting will be held in Munich,
 Germany
 u=http://www.ietf.org/meetings/Munich.html
 e=IETF Channel 1 <ietf39-mbone@uni-koeln.de>
 p=IETF Channel 1 +49-172-2312 451
 c=IN IP4 224.0.1.11/127
 t=3080271600 3080703600
 a=tool:sdr v2.4a6
 a=type:test
 m=audio 21010 RTP/AVP 5
 c=IN IP4 224.0.1.11/127
 a=ptime:40
 m=video 61010 RTP/AVP 31
 c=IN IP4 224.0.1.12/127

M->C: RTSP/1.0 200 OK
 Supported: method.announce
 CSeq: 90

5.2 Server Announcing End Of Stream

In this example, the server announces the END_OF_STREAM event to client for one live media stream, because upstream source terminates the stream after 200 seconds. The fact that the stream has played for 200 seconds is communicated by the Range header in the ANNOUNCE request.

C->S: PLAY rtsp://foo.com/bar.avi/streamid=0 RTSP/1.0
 Supported: method.announce
 CSeq: 10
 Session: 12345678
 Range: 0-200

S->C: RTSP/1.0 200 OK
 Supported: method.announce
 CSeq: 10
 Session: 12345678
 RTP-Info: url=//foo.com/bar.avi/streamid=0;seq=0; rtptime=0

S->C: ANNOUNCE rtsp://foo.com/bar.avi/streamid=0 RTSP/1.0
 CSeq: 123
 Session: 12345678
 Range: npt=0-200
 RTP-Info: url=//foo.com/bar.avi/streamid=0;seq=45102
 Reason: End of range reached

C->S: RTSP/1.0 200 OK
 CSeq: 123

Session: 12345678

From the ANNOUNCE request, the client will learn that the server has completed the stream as requested (as indicated by the "End of range reached" Reason).

From the two RTP-Info headers, one in PLAY response, one in ANNOUNCE request, the client can derive the total number of RTP packets that the server has sent. From the npt field in the Range header, the client knows the presentation time that this stream has covered, from the server's point of view.

6. Security Considerations

Because there is only one new TEXT header, "Reason", added by the extension RTSP method, the security considerations outlined in [RTSP_NEW] apply here as well.

7. IANA Considerations

A new method name, and its associated feature tag need to be registered with IANA.

-- Method name: ANNOUNCE

-- feature tag: method.announce

Normative References

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RAFT: RTSP Authenticatable Firewall Traversal Protocol
draft-zeng-mmusic-raft-00

Status of this Memo

This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.

Abstract

This document describes a simple firewall traversal protocol for the RTP data stream of an RTSP session.

This protocol solves not only solves the firewall traversal problem, but also provides authentication to guard against DoS (Denial of Service) attacks in applications where the RTP packet receiver has a different IP address than the RTSP client.

The protocol assumes that the RTSP server is in the public domain network, and that RTSP clients may or may not reside behind firewalls

or NATs - Native Address Translators. For simplicity we use "firewall"

to refer to any middle box, firewalls and NATs alike, that masquerades the IP address and/or port. More over, we assume that the media transport is using RTP over UDP.

From the client's RTP receive socket, the client sends probing UDP packets (called firewall packets) to the UDP send port on the server, from which the server will send RTP packets.

The content of the firewall packet contains a digital signature for authentication purpose.

The RTSP server figures out the external IP and port of the client's RTP receive socket by performing address translation using the firewall packets.

If the external IP of the firewall packet is the same as the perceived

client IP address in the RTSP connection, the server treats the client

as one that uses the same IP endpoint to host RTP and RTSP modules. In this case, the server acknowledges the firewall packet with a firewall answer packet packet in the reverse direction, and the server then starts to send the RTP packet stream using the perceived external IP and port, thus penetrating the firewall. Since the client initiates UDP traffic, this scheme works over symmetric NATs, which STUN (rfc3489) does not.

However, if the server determines that the client is dual-hosted,

i.e., the external IP address of the client's RTP receive socket is different than that of the client's RTSP socket (as seen from outside of the firewall)
, the server, as a protection against potential DoS attack, sends a FW request as the address challenging request, to confirm that it is authorized to send RTP packets to this new host (i.e., the RTP host). The RTP host should reply by sending a FW response packet, with proper signature. Only after the server has received an answer to its request with a valid signature, that it will begin to send RTP packets to that host.

1. Applicability Statement

This protocol is an extension to RTSP [RTSP_NEW]. It only solves firewall traversal problem for multimedia streaming applications under the following conditions:

1. The RTSP connection is over TCP or TLS;
2. The RTP streams are carried over UDP;
3. The server is in the open, ie. it is not behind a firewall;
4. The loss rate of UDP packets is not excessively high.

This protocol depends on UDP packets to perform firewall exchange. Although multiple attempts are made during firewall exchange, the number of attempts is limited and would break down over high loss channel if all firewall packets get lost.

2. Requirements

An authenticated RTSP firewall solution should meet the following requirements:

1. Minimal delay: a firewall traversal algorithm should not incur excessive delay on top of the normal RTSP delay.
2. Minimal price: for a client that is in the open, it should pay very little price (or no price at all) in terms of delay or complexity. That is to say, the firewall solution should quickly realize that there is no firewall in the middle and allow RTSP server to operate normally. Note the server still needs to challenge the client if it is dual-hosted in the open.
3. For a client that hosts RTP and RTSP modules from the same IP address, it should not perform additional message exchange for authentication.

Additionally, the authentication part of the RTSP firewall protocol should meet the following requirements:

4. For the authentication feature to be used as a security measure against DoS attacks, it should be convenient and transparent enough that people actually turn them on. (See bullet 9, pp. 621 of [CRYP]).
5. Security should be designed as a basic feature, rather than

a latter add-on. (See bullet 10, pp. 621 of [CRYP]).

3. Overview of Operation

The operation of the RTSP authenticated firewall traversal involves the following steps: 1) generation of a session key; 2) probing of the firewall; 3) (optionally) Challenge of the dual-hosted receiver.

During step 1), if the RTSP server and client shares a secret, S , then the server uses S to generate a 128-bit session key, K , and transform it into 128-bit RTSP session_ID:

$$\text{session_ID} = E(K, S)$$

where E denotes the encryption transform AES (Advanced Encryption Standard, block cipher mode) [AES].

The RTSP server should ensure that the session_ID is unique in its current list of clients.

However, if the RTSP server and client has no pre-established shared secret, K is used as session_ID, i.e.:

$$\text{session_ID} = K$$

When client receives session_ID, it can obtain the session key, K to be used for all the streams in this RTSP session.

The server also records the perceived IP address of the client's RTSP socket, $\text{RTSP_ip}(\text{client})$.

Step 2) starts immediately after SETUP is complete on a media stream. We assume that in the SETUP response, the server includes a unique SSRC to be used as the sender SSRC in the corresponding RTP session. As a notation, $\text{FW}(k)$ denotes the k -th firewall packet, where $k=0, 1, 2, \dots$

In step 2), the client constructs a firewall packet $\text{FW}(0)$ using the server SSRC, and signs it using K . It sends the resultant packet to the sender's IP address and port in the Transport header. To ensure delivery, the client sends multiple FW packets, $\text{FW}(i)$, $i=0, 1, 2, \dots, 9$, with incremental sequence numbers and at 1 second interval. As soon as the client receives a FW response, it stops send FW packets.

When the server receives $\text{FW}(r)$, it records the external IP, $\text{RTP_ip}(\text{client})$ of the client, and port, $\text{RTP_port}(\text{client})$ as seen in the IP header of $\text{FW}(r)$.

It also records r to be used in the firewall response packet.

From here on there are two possible paths for the protocol:

Path 1) If $\text{RTP_ip}(\text{client}) == \text{RTSP_ip}(\text{client})$, the client is a single hosted application, so the RTSP server responds with a series of

FW response packet, FW_response(i), i=0,1,2,...
which has the same format as
FW packet, but 1) uses a different packet type
2) a different nonce that is 1 plus i plus the nonce in the request.
3) The sequence number in the response is r.
This response is signed using K, too.

Path 2) If RTP_ip(client) != RTSP_ip(client), the client
is deemed a dual hosted application. To prevent DoS attack,
the server should challenge RTP_ip(client) to verify its
willingness to accept RTP media stream. So the RTSP server
sends a succession of FW request packet, FW(c), c=0,1,2...
(each with proper digital signature as usual)
to port=RTP_port(client) on IP=RTP_ip(client), with new nonce,
and consecutive sequence numbers and 1 second interval.

On the client side, when it receives FW(c), where c is the
sequence number, if it is indeed willing to accept the
media stream, it will construct a FW response packet,
FW_response(r), r=0,1,2,..., in which:

- 1) the sequence number is "c",
- 2) packet type is response type
- 3) nonce is r plus 1 plus nonce in FW(c).

This series of FW_response(r)'s are repeatedly
sent to the RTP send socket at the server, until
the client has received
RTP media packets, or that it has
reached maximum number of repeats (default is 10). The repeat
interval is 1 second by default. In each repetition the number "r"
is
incremented by 1.

When the server receives the response to its FW request, it
is satisfied that RTP_ip(client) is willing to accept the
RTP media stream at port RTP_port(client).

Now and only now the server can start sending media packets
to port=RTP_port(client) on IP = RTP_ip(client).

If the server never receives the response to its FW request,
event after max number of tries, it considers the client as a
attacker, hence will take immediate protective actions, such
as: terminating the RTSP connection, freeing any resources (
such as session ID and session key), and logging an attack
warning in its security log. Using the security log,
system administrator can trace back the attacker since
the attacker's identity might be carried in RTSP_ip(client)
and in the shared secrete.

4. Message Description

We now describe the format of the firewall packet.

4.1. Format of FW Packet

The firewall packet is a UDP

packet, consisting of a fixed length header and a body.

The header has 32 bits, which is divided in three subfields:

- A 16-bit magic word, which is used to distinguish it from a RTP or RTCP packet. The word has 16 zeros. Since the first 16 bits of RTP packet contains the non-zero version number, this magic work is guranteed to be different than RTP/RTCP header.
- An 8-bit version number, currently set to 0. This version number is useful if the packet format needs to be upgraded in the future. A receiver that does not support this version number should ignore the entire FW packet.
- An 8-bit packet type, which indicates the purpose of the packet. The packet type is one of:
 - 0x00: request;
 - 0x01: response;

```

0          1          2          3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+++++
|      MagicWord=0x0000      | version=00  |      type      |
+++++
|      Server's RTP session  SSRC      |
+++++
|      sequence number      (w/ random offset in RTP-Info)      |
+++++
|      nunce (32 bits)      |
+++++
|      digital signature (DS)      |
|      .... (160 bits, SHA)      |
+++++
```

The message body contains the following fields:

- SSRC: this is the server's SSRC used for this RTP session. It can uniquely identify the RTP session at the server. Useful when one send port is used for multiple RTP clients by the server.

- Randomized sequence number:
This is the sequence number of the firewall exchange, randomized by the random offset signalled in the RTSP SETUP response of this stream.

The legal sequence number, before randomization, is between 1 and 10

- clients should stop after 10 tries. This way if after subtracting random offset, the sequence number is not in the expected range, it is deemed malicious and dropped (with a warning log to alert the spoofing attempt).

- nonce: a random 32-bit value

- Digital signature:

The default authentication scheme uses SHA-1 one way hash (see [SHA1]). Other hash algorithms can be adopted in the future, by either defining different packet types or new version numbers.

The SHA-1 hash value has 160 bits, and is computed over the entire firewall packet.

6. Use cases

The following sub-sections illustrate use cases for RAFT, where RTSP is the signalling protocol in the multimedia streaming application, while RTP/AVP (i.e., RTP over UDP) is the transport mechanism.

6.1 Client in the open

6.1.1 Client in the open and is single hosted

In this use case, the RAFT protocol exchange takes place in following steps:

1. After RTSP SETUP, the client starts firewall exchange by sending FW packets to server.
2. When server receives one of the FW packets, it learns that the client is in the open and is not dual-hosted, therefore it can start the RTP media stream any time after RTSP PLAY. It sends a FW response to the client as well. Note that even if the client's FW packets are all lost, the server still starts RTP stream, using the address and port in the client's SETUP request, after RTSP PLAY processing. So it is clear that no extra delay is introduced by RAFT.

6.1.2 Client in the open and is dual-hosted

In this use case, the RAFT protocol exchange takes place in following steps:

1. After RTSP SETUP, the client starts firewall exchange by sending FW packets to server.
2. When server receives one of the FW packets, it learns that the client is in the open but is dual-hosted, therefore it should challenge the RTP receiver before media stream can be sent. So instead of FW response, it sends a FW request to the client's RTP receiver host, in order to confirm that the host is willing to accept RTP media stream corresponding to the RTSP session.
3. When receiver host receives the FW request from the server, it answers it with an FW response.
4. When RTSP server receives the FW response, and is able to match the digital signature, it is ready to send RTP media stream anytime after RTSP PLAY.

In this scenario extra round-trip is required to perform receiver challenge using FW request/response mechanism. Such delay is unavoidable as long as authentication is needed to verify dual-hosted RTP receivers.

6.2 Client not in the open

6.2.1. Client not in the open and is single hosted

In this use case, the RAFT protocol exchange takes place in following steps:

1. After RTSP SETUP, the client starts firewall exchange by sending FW packets to server.
2. When server receives one of the FW packets, it learns that is not dual-hosted, and it also learns the external IP and port of the client.
Now it can start the RTP media stream any time after RTSP PLAY.
To inform the client so it will not repeat FW packets, the server sends a FW response to the client as well.
However, if the clients FW packets are all lost, the server still starts RTP stream, using the address and port in the client's SETUP request, after RTSP PLAY processing.
No extra delay is introduced by RAFT, but the client will not receive any RTP packets and would eventually timeout waiting for media data. Such a poor application behaviour is unavoidable due to excessive packet loss rate.

6.2.2. Client not in the open and is dual-hosted

In this use case, the RAFT protocol exchange takes place in following steps:

1. After RTSP SETUP, the client starts firewall exchange by sending FW packets to server.
2. When server receives one of the FW packets, it learns that the client is NOT in the open and appears to be dual-hosted,
judging by external IPs of the RTSP address and RTP address of the client.
Therefor it should challenge the RTP receiver before media stream can be sent. So instead of FW response, it sends a FW request to the client's RTP receiver host, in order to confirm that the host is willing to accept RTP media stream corresponding to the RTSP session.
3. When receiver host receives the FW request from the server, it answers it with an FW response.
4. When RTSP server receives the FW response, and is able to

match the digital signature, it is ready to send RTP media stream anytime after RTSP PLAY.

7. Signalling For RAFT

7.1 Feature Tag

Following the RTSP extension methodology in [RTSP-CORE], we define a feature tag for RAFT:

rtsp.raft

7.2 Max Number of Attempts

We define a new parameter in SETUP response to signal, from server to client, the maximum number of attempts during RAFT packet exchange. By choosing this number to be zero, one can effectively turn off RAFT.

The new parameter is: max-raft-attempts

Example usage of the above signalling is shown below:

```
C->S: SETUP rtsp://foo.com/movie.mp4/trackID=1
      CSeq: 10
      Session: 0123456789012345
      Supported: rtsp.raft
      Transport: RTP/AVP;unicast;client_port=1234-1235;
                max-raft-attempts=10

S->C: RTSP/1.0 200 OK
      CSeq: 10
      Session: 0123456789012345
      Supported: rtsp.raft
      Transport: RTP/AVP; unicast; server_port=5678-5679;
                max-raft-attempts=10
```

8. Security Considerations

RAFT is an extension to the RTSP core protocol, with the explicit purposes to 1) solve firewall traversal problem;
2) solve the security problem in dual-hosted applications.

This section describes security considerations beyond those in [RTSP-CORE]

8.1 Attack Classifications

The main concern is the denial or degrading of service attacks (DDOS attacks) that use a multimedia server to send RTP media streams to unwilling receivers, because such an attack provides substantial amplification given the generally large number of packets in multimedia streams.

There are two ways to launch DDOS attacks using a RTSP server

equipped with RAFT:

- Denial or Degrading of service (DDOS) attacks can be launched by man-in-the-middle (MITM).
- DDOS attacks can be launched by a rogue client.

8.2 Man In The Middle Attacks

In this case, the attacker takes over control of one or more routers between RTSP server and client. It intercepts RAFT packets from client to server, modifies its IP header to make it look like that it comes from the target host. It also intercepts the challenge packets and fakes FW response to answer the challenges.

This type of attack requires:

- 1) The attacker has the ability to spoof IP header on the FW packets from client to server.
- 2) The attacker has the ability to intercept the RAFT challenges (which are FW request packets) and fake a FW response packet with correct digital signature.

To attack, the attacker should have the valid session key which only the RTSP client and the server should know.

8.3 Rogue Client Attack

Rather than simply intercepting traffic between RTSP client and server, the attacker may pretend to be a legitimate RTSP client, and tries to cause the server to send RTP streams to the victim host.

This type of attack requires:

- 1) The attacker is an authorized RTSP client.
- 2) The attacker still has to be able to divert to itself the RAFT challenge packets from server to the victim host, and fake responses to them.

8.4 Countermeasures

RAFT provides the following countermeasures:

- 1) MITM attacks can be prevented by the digital signature in each RAFT packet. We recommend that applications SHOULD not use RTSP session ID directly as session key, but rather establishes shared secret which can be used to map session ID to the actual authentication session key. Such shared secret effectively stops MITM attacks.
- 2) As to "Rogue Client Attacks", we recommend that the authentication key to be tied to host identity, whenever possible. This requires the availability of authentication server where the RTSP server can look up the proper key based on the identity of the intended

RTP receiver host, rather than using the RTSP session key, because a rogue client does not have the authentication key of the victim host.

If the service does exist for the RTSP server to look up authentication key based on RTP receiver host name or address, then the FW request that is used to challenge the RTP receiver, will use the authentication key associated with the RTP receiver host. And the FW response that is used to answer the aforementioned challenge, should also be signed with the RTP receiver's authentication key. With such measures, rogue client attacks are no longer effective.

9. IAB Considerations

The IAB has studied the problem of "Unilateral Self Address Fixing", which is the general process by which a client attempts to determine its address in another realm on the other side of a NAT through a collaborative protocol reflection mechanism (RFC 3424 [17]). RAFT is an example of a protocol that performs this type of function. The IAB has mandated that any protocols developed for this purpose document a specific set of considerations. This section meets those requirements.

9.1 Problem Definition

From RFC 3424 [17], any UNSAF proposal should provide:

Precise definition of a specific, limited-scope problem that is to be solved with the UNSAF proposal. A short term fix should not be generalized to solve other problems; this is why "short term fixes usually aren't".

The specific problems being solved by RAFT are:

- o Provide a means for a RTSP client to obtain a binding on a NAT such that the open-Internet RTSP server's RTP packets can traverse the firewall to reach the client.

RAFT does not address RTP over TCP.

9.2 Exit Strategy

From [17], any UNSAF proposal should provide:

Description of an exit strategy/transition plan. The better short term fixes are the ones that will naturally see less and less use as the appropriate technology is deployed.

RAFT comes with its own built in exit strategy. As NATs and FWs are phased out through the deployment of IPv6, the RTSP server

can signal to RTSP clients with a RAFT max-sequence number of 0, which will turn off RAFT.

9.3 Brittleness Introduced by RAFT

From [17], any UNSAF proposal should provide:

Discussion of specific issues that may render systems more "brittle". For example, approaches that involve using data at multiple network layers create more dependencies, increase debugging challenges, and make it harder to transition.

RAFT introduces the following brittleness issue:

- o RAFT assumes that the RTSP server exists on the public Internet. If the server is located in another private address realm, the client's FW packets may or may not be able to reach the server.
- o The binding obtained by the client's FW packet may be time limited. This binding life time may need to be extended with periodical FW packets from client to server. However, RAFT does not require client to send periodical FW packets. In our experience, the RTP stream from server to client in itself is sufficient to maintain the NAT binding on most, if not all, NATs. However, the RTP traffic from server to client may not be enough to maintain the binding if the NAT uses dynamic binding lifetimes to handle overload, or if the NAT itself reboots during the streaming process.

We note that RAFT works for ALL known NAT types, including symmetric ones.

9.4 Requirements for a Long Term Solution

From [17], any UNSAF proposal should provide:

Identify requirements for longer term, sound technical solutions
-- contribute to the process of finding the right longer term solution.

Our experience with RAFT has led to the following requirements for a long term solution to the NAT problem:

- o To reliably solve the RTSP NAT problem when both RTSP server and client are in separate private address realms, at least one RTP proxy should be provided in the public address realm.

10. IANA Considerations

A new feature tag should be registered with IANA:

-- feature tag: rtsp.raft

A new parameter in RTSP Transport header also needs to be registered with IANA. This parameter is:
max-raft-attempts

Normative References

- [RTSP_NEW] Schulzrinne, H., Rao, A., Lanphier, R., Westerlund, M.,
"Real Time Streaming Protocol",
draft-ietf-mmusic-rfc2326bis-04.txt
- [RTP_NEW] RFC3550 "Real-time Transport Protocol", July 2003
- [STUN] RFC3489 "STUN - Simple Traversal of User Datagram Protocol
(UDP) Through Network Address Translators (NATs)",
March 2003
- [SHA1] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
"Announcing the Secure Hash Standard", FIPS 180-1, U.S.
Department of Commerce, April 1995
- [AES] NIST, "Announcing the Advanced Encryption Standard",
FIPS 197, US. Department of Commerce, Nov. 2001

Informative References

- [CRYP] Schneier, B., "Applied Cryptography - Protocols, Algorithms,
and source code in C", 2nd edition, Wiley, 1996

Note there is a typo below: it said:

.. whether this has a chance to ever become the basis of a playlist RFC.

I meant:

whether this has a chance to ever become the basis of a playlist RFC.

This Playlist Play method is not in RTSP standard (rfc2326), and could be considered an extension to that standard -- in fact, we are considering submitting a proposal to IETF in the future.

>
> Near the end of the playlist SDD review yesterday, we touched upon the
> idea of using a new method, in lieu of "SET_PARAMETER", to request a new
> playlist update or to seek to a new clip within the same playlist.
>
> Although we originally thought that we were too late, schedule-wise, to
> make such a change, upon researching RTSP RFC more carefully, thinking
> through it more, and talking to a few people after the meeting, I have
> realized that, switching to a new method would most likely shorten the
> overall development cycle for playlist feature (i.e., 3.4.2 release).
>
> this release will affect the ease of error handling of the protocol between the
> streamer and the playlist client, the flexibility of such protocol to adapt
> to future requirement changes (from Sony or from other customers), and
> eventually (perhaps less importantly), whether this has a chance to ever
> become the basis of a playlist RFC.
>
> 1. The two options
> First, allow me to present the two options in front of us.
> * SET_PARAMETER
> This is the approach that we have taken probably since the
> beginning of SDD work. Dave has clearly documented it. Here is the excerpt
> from page 9 of Dave's latest SDD (version 0.4):
>
> ...
> 14. Client application requests a new playlist after a specified
> amount of time after providing user feedback.
> 15. PMA server returns a new playlist file and URL.

```

> beginning of SDD work. Dave has clearly documented it. Here is the
excerpt
> from page 9 of Dave's latest SDD (version 0.4):
>
> ...
> 14.      Client application requests a new playlist after a
specified
> amount of time after providing user feedback.
> 15.      PMA server returns a new playlist file and URL.
> 16.      Client application calls a new SET_PARAM API on player
> engine and passes it the playlist URL to request streaming from the
new
> playlist.
> 17.      Player engine sends an RTSP SET_PARAMETER command to the
SM
> passing it the playlist URL.
> 18.      SM returns the NPT (normal play time) value at which the
> switch to streaming from the new playlist will occur.
> 19.      The player engine returns this NPT time value back up to
the
> player application so that it can update the display appropriately.
>
> An example SET_PARAMETER to update playlist and jump directly to clip
8,
> at end of current clip, is shown below:
>
>          CLIENT REQUEST
>          SET_PARAMETER rtsp://example.com/public/foo
RTSP/1.0
>          CSeq: 7
>          Session: 1234567890
>          Content-length: 40
>          Content-type: text/parameters
>
>          x-pv-playlist_url: /public/foo/foo1.ply
>          x-pv-clip_index: 8
>          x-pv-activate: End-Of-Clip
>
>          STREAMING MODULE RESPONSE
>          RTSP/1.0 200 OK
>          CSeq: 7
>          Session: 1234567890
>          Content-length: 24
>          Content-type: text/parameters
>
>          x-pv-playlist_url: /public/foo/foo1.ply
>          x-pv-clip_index: 8
>          x-pv-clip_ts: 65000
>
>
> *      PLAYLIST_PLAY
>
> In stead of using SET_PARAMETER in step 17 above, we follow the
spirit of
> RTSP extension mechanism (see section 1.5 of RFC2326), and use a new
> method, called PLAYLIST_PLAY, to support the new feature for seeking

```

```

> across playlists. Here is how it looks, in lieu of the message
exchange
> above:
>
> CLIENT REQUEST
> PLAYLIST_PLAY rtsp://example.com/public/foo
RTSP/1.0
> CSeq: 7
> Session: 1234567890
> Range:
> playlist_play_time=<rtsp://public/foo/foo1.ply, 8, 0>; time=End-Of-
Clip
>
> STREAMING MODULE RESPONSE
> RTSP/1.0 200 OK
> CSeq: 7
> Session: 1234567890
> Range:
> playlist_play_time=<rtsp://public/foo/foo1.ply, 8, 0>; npt=65000-
>
>
> The semantics of PLAYLIST_PLAY is almost the same as "PLAY" method
as
> defined in RFC2326, with the following exceptions:
> * No RTP-Info header in the response (it is not necessary, since
the
> rtp time and seq are continuous -- we are effectively simulating live
> stream).
> * Range type is new, specified in a new format designed
specifically
> for playlist support. This "playlist_play_time" is a tuple with the
url
> of the playlist file, the clip index, and NPT time inside the clip.
> * The time parameter (see page 34 rfc2326) in Range header takes
on
> new reserved tokens:
> * "NOW" means the time to execute the "PLAYLIST_PLAY" request is
right
> now,
> * "End-Of-Clip" means clip boundary
> * "End-Of-Playlist" means end of current playlist
> * In the response to PLAYLIST_PLAY, in the Range header, the
> "time=End-Of-Clip" is replaced with "npt=" parameter, to inform the
client
> that End-Of-Clip actually maps to NPT time of 65000. Meaning that the
> presentation of =<rtsp://public/foo/foo1.ply, 8, 0> will begin at
> NPT=650000. With this information, the client can update the clip
banner
> information accordingly. Client also has enough information to derive
the
> RTP timestamp corresponding to the first RTP packet for the requested
clip
> in the new playlist.
>
> Note the open ended range just means that the end time of the
playlist
> session is unknown, in line with Sony requirement.

```

```

>
>
> 2. Implementation analysis
>
>   In this section we try to compare the merits of the two
> approaches.
> *   SET_PARAMETER approach:
>
>   To implement SET_PARAMETER option, the normal scenario is rather
> simple, but problem arises in two areas:
>   1. Error handling is more complex. The following example is
> taken
> from section 3.2.4 of Dave's SDD:
>
>   STREAMING MODULE ERROR RESPONSE
>   RTSP/1.0 200 OK
>   CSeq: 7
>   Session: 1234567890
>   Content-length: 24
>   Content-type: text/parameters
>
>   x-pv-playlist_url: /public/foo/fool.ply
>   x-pv-clip_ts: 64385
>   x-pv-clip_index: 9
>   x-pv-error_code: Requested clip not found
>
>   Notice that in an RTSP 200 OK response, we are actually
> reporting
> an error !
>   In contrast, the same error can be reported, when request is
> made
> by PLAYLIST_PLAY, using the 457 code in section 11.3.8 of RFC2326.
> Simply:
>
>   RTSP/1.0 457
>   The Range specified a clip that is not found.
>
>   Note that 457 is already implement in Streamer, whilst the
> "x-pv-error_code" fields will have to be thought through and
> implemented
> anew -- not a trivial task given that more than 33% of streamer
> development effort has been spent on error handling.
>
>   That is the fundamental reason why the new method approach
> will
> end up saving us develeopment time, we believe.
>
>   2. SET_PARAMETER approach will be more difficult to adapt to
> potential new requirements. One such new potential feature is the
> ability
> to random position to any synch point in any clip across playlists.
> For
> Sony it is not possible since PMA client has timing only accurate to
> seconds.
>   In contrast, this new feature can be easily implemented by
> putting a non-zero value in the last field in the
> "playlist_play_time"
> tuple. Done !
>

```

>
> 3. Closing thoughts
>
> Fundamentaly, because we are adding a new feature, i.e., controlling
a new
> type of resource -- playlist resource, it is more natural to extend
> RFC2326 via a method, rather than via some x-pv parameters for
> SET_PARAMETER method.
>